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## ABSTRACT

BLUNTING THE SHARP SWORD? THE IMPACT OF 21st CENTURY NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVES ON MILITARY OPERATIONS, by Major Charles D. Lawhorn, 62 pages.

United States military forces face a different world as the 21st century begins. The phenomenon known as "globalization" has created increased political, economic, and social interdependence among nations. With the emergence of new regional and trans-national threats, world stability becomes a far greater challenge for the engagement strategies of the United States. For the United States to retain its prominent role in world affairs it must continue to exercise leadership abroad. Evolving national security policy originating from the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the "Hart-Rudman" Commission), the *National Security Strategy*, and national security directives are suggesting the continued use of U.S. military force deployments in support of peace operations, notwithstanding criticism that utilization of military forces in peace operations degrades warfighting capability. This monograph traces the development of current national security themes from American preference for annihilation strategies and distaste of limited wars, and the historical dissonance between military resources allocated in peacetime and those found to be required for war. It examines recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission, and implementation of national security policy through Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), to evaluate their probable impact on the operational preparedness of U.S. military forces and military "readiness." It concludes that use of U.S. military forces for engagement strategies in support of peace operations is a valid and wise exercise of the military implement of national power. In the 21st century the need for peace operations is likely to increase, rather than decrease, and future coordination between the military and other U.S. agencies such as the Department of State will become all the more important. Peace operations, it is concluded, do not unreasonably degrade the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces, but in many ways enhance it. If properly resourced to allow expansion of needed military force structure, adequate training, and equipment to perform peace operations as well as major theater warfighting missions, increased use of military forces for peace operations will not degrade military combat capability. To ensure peace, larger peacetime military commitments are predicted. The capabilities of the U.S. military play an essential role in complementing the other elements of national power, and establishing a credible deterrent to rogue actors. With proper support to maintain technological superiority, the U.S. military will continue to effectively enhance U.S. leadership initiatives abroad, and through forward presence and power-projection capability increase regional stability and internal U.S. security.

**Blunting the Sharp Sword? The Impact of 21<sup>st</sup> Century National  
Security Policy Initiatives on Military Operations**

**MONOGRAPH**  
**BY**  
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## CHAPTER 1

### THE SHARP SWORD

We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later, someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.<sup>1</sup>

-- Clausewitz, *On War*

### INTRODUCTION

Carl von Clausewitz, writing more than a century and a half ago, identified the need to keep military forces ready and not allow the slaughter of war to “provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity,” risking the loss of life and limb to another foe’s sharp sword.<sup>2</sup> There is an argument to be made that over the last decade the United States has been doing just that, blunting its warfighting capability by deploying its military forces in a record number of peace operations. If “[w]ar is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,”<sup>3</sup> as Clausewitz states, then is our ability to go beyond coercion and execute decisive military operations blunted by increased utilization of forces in peace keeping missions? Military missions are given by civilian authority, creating a direct impact of policy and strategy on the execution, or conduct, of military operations. There is a political object to war. In discussion of his idea that the object of war is the continuation of policy by other means, Clausewitz writes: “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”<sup>4</sup> This monograph focuses on developing national security policy and its

impact on Clausewitz's "sharp sword" and trends toward increased operational deployment of U.S. military forces in peace operations.

Clausewitz is direct when expressing his concern over the blunting of swords. Nations and their armies prepare for war to impose their will and accomplish political objectives. The strength of that effort may be determined by the sharpness of the military sword, a sword honed through training and preparedness. Neglect that preparedness, that readiness to wield the military power which supports, in no small measure, all the other elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, economic), and there is always the danger of losing "limbs" essential to the stability or continuance of a state. Those limbs could be territory, an economic hegemony, natural resources, access to global and regional markets, or any number of national interests. In addition to states, trans-national actors like drug cartels or other types of crime organizations, and state and non-state sponsored terrorists, also possess war-making capabilities.

## THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A glimpse into the last two *National Security Strategies* of the United States (1998, 1999) examines these conditions. "Globalization -- the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political interaction -- is bringing citizens from all continents closer together, allowing them to share ideas, goods and information in an instant."<sup>5</sup> According to celebrated economist Thomas L. Friedman, globalization is not a temporary aberration; globalization is here to stay. "Globalization," writes Friedman, "is not a phenomenon. It is not just some passing trend. Today it is the overarching international system shaping the domestic politics and foreign relations of virtually every country, and we need to understand it as such."<sup>6</sup> Along with the benefits of

cooperation and prosperity which globalization potentially provides, risks and threats also are enhanced:

Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability and progress in many important areas of the world. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime are global concerns that transcend national borders. Other problems originating overseas -- such as resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, new infectious diseases, pervasive corruption, and uncontrolled refugee migration -- have increasingly important implications for American security.”<sup>7</sup>

Coming hand-in-hand with the promise of new beginnings and new hope for the advancement of U.S. national security interests are promises also of new threats and an increasingly unstable world environment that is ever more responsive to events in areas separated potentially by great geographic distance but linked through the economic and cultural media of globalization. With technology increasing the potential decentralization of power once monopolized by the state into the hands of a few disparate actors, the isolated act may now have global significance. The newly armed actor now possesses both the means to create havoc, and the media to project its results. There are historical parallels. Few would have believed the chance occurrence of assassination of Arch Duke Ferdinand by a radical would prove the catalyst for World War I. In the 21st century world of globalization, where weapons of mass destruction may reach the hands of many, the catalyst of change may be anywhere.

These views from the *National Security Strategy* published in December of 1999 just before the arrival of “Y2K” were the natural extension of the 1998 version of the National Security Strategy: “The military challenges of the 21st century . . . require a fundamental transformation of our military forces. Although future threats are fluid and unpredictable, U.S. forces are likely to confront a variety of challenges across the spectrum of conflict . . .”<sup>8</sup> Part of this challenge is found in those fluid and unpredictable threats such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and information warfare; asymmetric threats as part of asymmetric warfare. “Asymmetric warfare

involves each side playing by its own set of rules that emphasize their respective strengths, while attempting to exploit an adversary's weakness.”<sup>9</sup> This coincides with, and may be said to be part of, the information explosion that is the Information Age. “The increasing availability and affordability of information, information technologies, and Information Age weapons increases the potential for creating formidable foes from impotent adversaries.”<sup>10</sup> *Joint Vision 2020* has carried this theme of change forward in articulating the future of joint military operations: “[T]he continued development and proliferation of information technologies will substantially change the conduct of military operations.”<sup>11</sup>

It is into this uncertain, rapidly evolving environment that the ever-shrinking forces of the U.S. military are deployed. As described by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the recent study *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, which examined military roles and military leadership challenges for this new century, “US military culture today is undergoing significant strain owing to a variety of factors. At no comparable period in our peacetime history has the United States leaned more heavily or frequently on its armed forces. A breathless pace of operations as well as constrained resources, changing missions, shifts in marital status and demographics of the uniformed population, rapid advances in technology, and competing opportunities in a robust civilian society are dramatically affecting the organizational climate . . .”<sup>12</sup> The study notes: “All available evidence gathered in this study strongly suggests that the US military is nearing a critical juncture as it enters the twenty-first century.”<sup>13</sup>

According to *Joint Vision 2020*, as an element of national power, and “in support of the objectives of our National Security Strategy, it [the military] is routinely employed to shape the international security environment and stands ready to respond across the full range of potential military operations.”<sup>14</sup> “The U.S. military plays an essential role in building coalitions and

shaping the international environment in ways that protect and promote U.S. interests.”<sup>15</sup> Through “overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities”, which include diplomatic as well as military overtures with sovereign and emerging states; through deterrence based on “credible warfighting capability”; through the “ability to form and lead effective military coalitions”; and as a “role model for [other] militaries”, the U.S. military performs these duties.<sup>16</sup>

There is a real tension here, however, between the perceived capabilities of the military and the missions assigned to it since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War. “The U.S. military plays a crucial role in shaping the international security environment in ways that protect and promote U.S. interests, but is not a substitute for other forms of engagement, such as diplomatic, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and educational activities.”<sup>17</sup> Indeed, “[a]lthough military activities are an important pillar of our effort to shape the global security environment, we must always be mindful that the primary mission of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened.”<sup>18</sup> How does this reconcile with increased emphasis on peace operations in areas such as Somalia, Bosnia, or Kosovo? How does this reconcile with the resources given the military for these missions?

The current *National Security Strategy*<sup>19</sup> acknowledges the lack of resources to commit military forces indiscretely, and states that the use of the military is carefully measured under policies in place since 1997. “Just as American engagement overall must be selective -- focusing on the threats and opportunities most relevant to our interests and applying our resources where we can make the greatest difference -- so must our use of the Armed Forces for engagement be selective.”<sup>20</sup> Further, the *National Security Strategy* states:

Engagement activities must be carefully managed to prevent erosion of our military's current and long-term readiness. The Defense Department's theater engagement planning process, which was approved by the President in 1997, helps ensure that military engagement activities are prioritized within and across theaters, and balanced against available resources. In short, we must prioritize military engagement activities to ensure the readiness of our Armed Forces to carry out crisis response and warfighting missions, as well as to ensure that we can sustain an appropriate level of engagement activities over the long term."<sup>21</sup>

It is not difficult to see how direct guidance from the White House, as given in the *National Security Strategy*, can impact the course and direction of military operations. Issues pertaining to available military resources are to be weighed and considered, and the *National Security Strategy* discusses the importance of warfighting capability and readiness.

The need to maintain warfighting capability, with credible deterrence and the ability to execute decisive operations, and the readiness component whereby forces are available and properly trained to do their jobs, are part and parcel of one another. Just how to do this is the question.

As the United States moves into the 21st century, it is not just the next version of the *National Security Strategy* which will comprise the cauldron from which policy formulation emanates. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),<sup>22</sup> set to begin in the Spring of 2001, will have its say, as will the U.S. Congress, and the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century chaired by two prominent senators (Warren B. Rudman and Gary Hart, who have lent their name to a popular title, the "Hart-Rudman Commission") and instituted during the Clinton Administration but tendering its work within a new administration. Perhaps, just as significantly, the new administration's enactment of Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that guide national security policy, extending, complementing, or supplanting those of the past administration, will be pivotal.

This monograph examines the influence of evolving national security policy. It examines the impact of PDDs on national security policy, the input represented by the Hart-Rudman Commission, and the resulting impact on national security policy and the operational readiness of U.S. military forces. It seeks to determine whether the emerging influences such as the Hart-Rudman Commission reports, and PDD-71 from the Clinton Administration, which places overall control for peace operations in the hands of the U.S. Department of State, will continue the trend toward more expansive military involvement in peace operations. Secondly, will a trend toward more involvement in peace operations unreasonably degrade military readiness and warfighting capability? In other words, looking back to Clausewitz's concern raised at the start of this monograph, is the United States blunting its sharp sword by continued roles in peace keeping missions?

To perform this examination, this monograph takes a brief look at historical uses of U.S. military forces, including American focus on strategies of annihilation or exhaustion, and discusses the issue of "readiness" and its meaning in a contemporary context. This monograph will then discuss the work of the Hart-Rudman Commission, and its final report issued January 31, 2001, containing recommendations for national security policy, and presidential orders by way of PDDs and how they impact policy and ultimately the military. Finally, it will define and apply a set of criteria to the information presented. Among the material examined will be the so-called "Moskos Report"<sup>23</sup> on Task Force Falcon in the Balkans, issued in October 2000, and its conclusions as to the impact of peace operations on military readiness. Through discussion and analysis of the criteria, this monograph will make an evaluative determination, and present a synthesis by way of conclusions affecting national security policy, and military policy, at this juncture.

## CHAPTER 2

### FORGING THE SWORD - READY FOR WHAT?

This vast empire of theirs has come to them as the prize of valour, and not as a gift of fortune. For their nation does not wait for the outbreak of war to give men their first lesson in arms.<sup>24</sup>

Grant, *The Army of the Caesars*

#### INTRODUCTION

It is hard to understand the march of national security policy, and the approach of the U.S. military to implementation of that policy, without examining the underlying principle or principles which guide civil and military leaders in approaching warfare. “In the history of American strategy, the direction taken by the American conception of war made most American strategists, through most of the time span of American history, strategists of annihilation.”<sup>25</sup> This was not always the case, as the newly formed United States of America and George Washington’s Continental Army by necessity adopted what might better be termed as a war of wills and attrition against the powerful British regulars. “At the beginning, when American military resources were still slight, America made a promising beginning in the nurture of strategists of attrition; but the wealth of the country and its adoption of unlimited aims in war cut that development short, until the strategy of annihilation became characteristically the American way in war.”<sup>26</sup>

War aims, be they political, economic, or militarily focused, may take on a life of their own based on the mode of their pursuit, and whether a strategy of annihilation or attrition is adopted. Hans Delbrück, a German military historian, discussed the military strategy of nations in terms of the two types of war identified by Clausewitz -- war to completely overthrow the enemy, or war

simply to seek conquests “near the frontiers of an enemy’s country.”<sup>27</sup> Delbrück agrees with Clausewitz’s approach and links the waging of war to a similarly defined military strategy. “Delbrück suggested that there are two kinds of military strategy: the strategy of annihilation, which seeks the overthrow of the enemy’s military power; and the strategy of attrition, exhaustion, or erosion, which is usually employed by a strategist whose means are not great enough to permit pursuit of the direct overthrow of the enemy and who therefore resorts to an indirect approach.”<sup>28</sup> The unconditional surrender sought from Japan during World War II, coupled with the related decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan, constituted an example of adherence to an annihilation strategy.

Limited wars closely echo the type of military strategy involved in attrition wars. The concept of a “limited war” for the United States did not really exist before the 1950s.<sup>29</sup> This type of war is “limited” in terms of a conventional conflict, designed to meet specific political ends by wielding military and diplomatic power without need of complete destruction of the enemy’s forces. “The object of the war is political, to be obtained by negotiation and compromise, and not military, involving the physical destruction of the enemy.”<sup>30</sup> Limited war concepts have applicability because of the United States’ involvement in smaller scale contingencies (SSCs) (operations smaller than major theater of wars). These may arise from participation in a peace operation, and range from traditional warfighting to the edge of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The *National Security Strategy* also directs that military forces be prepared for limited conflicts and SSCs:

In addition to defending the U.S. homeland, the United States must be prepared to respond to the full range of threats to our interests abroad. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, and reinforcing key allies.<sup>31</sup>

In the realm of policy, and of military operations, thought on limited war bridges the gap between MOOTW and SSCs much as the operational level of war exists as the transition between the strategic and the tactical.

That is not to say that limited wars (essentially attrition wars focused on attrition strategy) are political, while total wars (those geared toward annihilation strategy) are not. Just the opposite is argued by Stephen Rosen. According to Rosen, “[w]hile it is true that limited wars deal with smaller problems than those found in total wars, in both kinds of wars the objects have been *political*. Both world wars had explicitly political objectives and were the extension of politics just as much as in any smaller war.”<sup>32</sup> (Emphasis in original.) “[T]he special problem of limited wars is ‘more broadly, the problem of combining military power with diplomacy and with the economic and psychological instruments of power . . .’”<sup>33</sup> Limited wars present special challenges for the use and deployment of U.S. Forces. They do not conform to the annihilation perspective of total war, and demand careful, measured responses in conjunction with other elements of national power.

There is an important distinction here, however: limited war is constrained by a political aim, which is itself based on a choice of overall strategy. “What is special about limited war is that resources and goals *are constrained by policy, not capabilities.*”<sup>34</sup> This makes limited wars not inconsistent with an American military tradition toward annihilation in that the limitations are themselves sought by the political leadership. Limited war, for the purposes of military thought and doctrine, does not reflect a lack of capability on the part of U.S. forces to conduct an annihilation war if needed, or a lack of confidence in that ability. Limited wars may be viewed militarily as a series of smaller, decisive annihilation battles or campaigns directed toward a (hopefully) discernable political end (a military end state).

Clausewitz recognized the concept of limited war, and peace operations are a kind of limited war.<sup>35</sup> Although Clausewitz does not address peace operations specifically in *On War*, in a Clausewitzian sense peace operations may be thought of as a kind of limited war because they involve the limited use of force, or threat of force, to accomplish a political end. Peace operations utilize military forces to compel another to accept the will of the United States or its allies.

Korea was a limited war; Vietnam was a limited war. The Cold War may be viewed as a series of limited wars carried out by other powers backed by the Soviet Union or the United States. The 1990-1991 Gulf War, for all its firepower, was a limited war. The recent 1999 air war in Kosovo, a precursor to the deployment of peace-keeping forces now to that region, was a limited war. Peace-keeping operations, peace enforcement operations, and nearly the entire sphere of Military operations other than war may themselves be viewed as a kind of limited war where military power is used sparingly to open the way for negotiation toward political objectives; the focus remains not on the military element of national power, but first and foremost on the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power.

## RESOURCES

There is a reason why the other elements of national power are important. The world is not one of unlimited resources for military might and force is not always the best option. “The United States must have the tools necessary to carry out this strategy [the *National Security Strategy*]. We have worked to preserve and enhance the readiness of our armed forces while pursuing long-term modernization and providing quality of life improvements for our men and women in uniform.”<sup>36</sup> These capabilities are necessary to carry out the *National Security Strategy*,

and its core objectives to “enhance America’s security, to bolster America’s economic prosperity, [and] to promote democracy and human rights abroad.”<sup>37</sup>

As noted by the military historian, S.L.A. Marshall, resource constraints limit military power. Resource limitations are the “one controlling truth from all past wars which applies with equal weight to any war of tomorrow,”<sup>38</sup> writes Marshall. “No nation in earth possesses such limitless resources that it can maintain itself in a state of perfect readiness to engage in war immediately and decisively win a total victory soon after the outbreak without destroying its own economy, pauperizing its own people, and promoting interior disorder.”<sup>39</sup> Much as Frederick the Great and other major European leaders discovered during continental wars in the 1600s, mobilizing, training, equipping, and fighting an army depletes a nation’s financial and other resources.

In the past the United States has tended to employ its military resources carefully. U.S. military forces have historically been used more for what we today refer to as SSCs and non-traditional missions than for large-scale combat such as World War I and II, and the Korean War. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the use of U.S. military forces in a variety of peace missions around the world has risen significantly. These missions have been conducted in the name of humanity as part of an engagement strategy, consistent with the *National Security Strategy* of the United States.

#### POLICY AS READINESS

Increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO) during force draw-downs and the lack of a defined, monolithic enemy have fostered an environment where civilian policy makers have forward-deployed U.S. forces on peace missions at an unprecedented rate. Numerous studies

identify the impact of these deployments on military “readiness,” though questions of “readiness” and the issue of “ready for what” remain relevant.

As observed by one readiness scholar, Richard K. Betts, “readiness is vital, yet hardly anyone really knows what it is.”<sup>40</sup> Given the early performance of the United States in many of its armed conflicts, it is arguable that the United States has had trouble coming to terms with what determines “readiness.” Historically, if the United States has had a strategy on readiness, for most of its existence it has been one of *unreadiness*:

Throughout most of its history the United States proved unready for the wars that it wound up fighting. Until after 1950, American mistakes in preparation for war exhibited a typical pattern: a peacetime military establishment too small and understaffed to serve effectively as a base for rapid expansion, a late start in mobilization, deficient peacetime plans for economic conversion resulting in prolonged delays and bottlenecks in war production, and poor coordination of manpower recruitment and equipment manufacturing.<sup>41</sup>

This “strategy of unreadiness” has been one where the consequences of unreadiness, and loss of life, were forgotten all too soon afterward. “Of the engagements fought by the U.S. Army at the beginning of ten of its wars, by one accounting half were defeats, and four were little more than pyrrhic victories. Only one, ‘the two-day battle of the Rio Grande in 1846, was relatively cheap, although even there losses approached 10 percent of the force engaged.’”<sup>42</sup> A *de facto* strategy of unreadiness limits military power that can be brought to bear in a conflict. In the case of World War I, for example, unreadiness produced conditions where “only a fraction of U.S. potential power was made actual in time to weigh in combat.”<sup>43</sup>

Just over fifty years after war with Mexico in 1846, the United States military force structure for the Spanish-American War was again in poor shape. In the years following the Civil War, for military units garrisoned on the frontiers (not unlike peace operations today) to deal with the American Indian threat to settlers moving west, training and resourcing were difficult. During

the period between the end of the Civil War and the Spanish-American war, “the entire army had averaged only 26,000 officers and enlisted men,’ dispersed all over the country in small units, with no opportunity to train and gain experience in “units larger than a regiment.”<sup>44</sup> The consequence: “When the Spanish-American War broke out, the army’s ability to expand and coordinate was handicapped by its prewar size and structure.”<sup>45</sup>

Additional examples of a military tradition of un readiness abound. Poorly trained American forces also showed their lack of readiness during World War II when “routed in their first encounter with German forces at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia”, and during the Korean War when “the battered elements of Task Force Smith” made their valliant but costly stand.<sup>46</sup> Against a Japanese military prepared for offensive operations, the United States proved it was unprepared for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and for the battle for the Phillipines in the Spring of 1942.

Task Force Smith, according to Betts, was the last event in the United States’ “tradition” of un readiness.<sup>47</sup> “The United States,” reasoned Betts, “has had two peacetime military traditions. The longest one was a tradition of rapid demobilization after each war and tardy remobilization for each new war [un readiness]. The second, dating from 1950, was the cold war tradition of peacetime mobilization: large forces in being, capable of immediate action.”<sup>48</sup>

The stakes of the Cold War were high. The Soviet Union had huge numbers of ground forces and nuclear stockpiles. A containment strategy against the Soviet Union had to be successful. Conditions which allowed for the potential defeat of the United States at the hands of the Chinese communists in the Korean peninsula had to be avoided. Korea was thus a painful “wake up call” of sorts for the United States. It could no longer have its allies hold the line while

it took years to prepare for employment of its forces. “If anything, the legacies of Pearl harbor and the retreat to Pusan turned readiness into an unquestioned virtue.”<sup>49</sup>

What, then, is this “unquestioned virtue”? What is readiness? Betts identifies three questions to ask about readiness: “readiness for *when*”; readiness for *what*; and “readiness of *what*.<sup>50</sup> Readiness for *when* requires a decision about how soon forces should be prepared to go into battle, and “the proper size of a peacetime gap between actual and potential military power.”<sup>51</sup> Readiness for *when* contains largely “political judgments concern[ing] whether, when, and how an adversary will decide to go to war, and whether, when and how decisionmakers will decide to authorize a surge of preparations in response.”<sup>52</sup> Readiness for *what* involves a decision about the capability needed, what kind of conflict is anticipated, and the enemy to be faced.<sup>53</sup> Readiness of *what* is essentially a resource-balancing equation among different elements of military power, and anticipating service-specific needs.<sup>54</sup> Air, naval, and land power have different dynamics, and what each takes to be prepared (by way of maintenance, equipment, training) will logically differ.<sup>55</sup>

Outside of the mathematics for varied measurements that might apply in a readiness calculation,<sup>56</sup> each of these readiness questions propounded by Betts (“*when*,” “*what*,” and “*of*”) contains a political element. Policy and the strategic level of war largely determine when forces are thought to be needed; how large or capable they need to be to counter existing or potential adversaries; and what elements of military power need to be employed. While world conditions factor into how these issues are viewed and the environment for military action, in the United States decisions about preparedness, and how “ready” military forces need to be, are largely made by political leaders. Policy, in essence, determines what “readiness” is, and what we are trying to be “ready for”, in Betts’ words.

General Wesley Clark addressed this issue in a September 2000 article for the *Washington Post* titled “Ready for What?”<sup>57</sup> General Clark, former commander of United States and NATO forces in Europe, was writing following a discussion about military readiness in August 2000 during the American presidential campaign. Concerns had been raised when commanders of two of the United States Army’s ten combat divisions reported the units were not ready for combat on their Unit Status Report (USR).<sup>58</sup> The way that alleged lack of readiness was reported or the divisions involved is less significant than the fire storm it caused not only in the presidential campaign, but in the media generally. Clark observed: “First there were the charges that two Army combat division weren’t ready. Then it was explained that this was an administrative quirk: These divisions weren’t “ready” because they were actually doing important military work on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo.”<sup>59</sup>

Clark’s point is well taken, still it highlights yet another problem. One man’s “quirk” is another man’s shortfall. The divisions were not “ready” for a larger warfighting mission because they were doing another mission: peace operations. Despite the fact that they were doing other missions, the consequence of having those forces involved in peace operations was a degeneration of the units’ ability to conduct warfighting missions based on their own evaluation criteria. One way to resolve this problem is to redefine the criteria and allow the units to report they are ready. That largely ignores the bigger policy issue, and may or may not be a legitimate means of resolving an apparent problem; essentially, you are defining it away. Another way is to examine the policy question which calls for the deployment of forces committed to a warfighting mission to a simultaneous peace operation. The policy question ultimately impacts the military: should those units, ordered to participate in peace-keeping missions by civilian authority, be doing those missions?

General Clark states the question in these terms:

Now we're hearing concerns about what the military should be doing and how it will fare in the future. The charge seems to be that the administration [the Clinton Administration] is running down the armed forces by deploying them too often. And so the issue seems to be this: How should the armed forces be used? What is it that we should be ready for? And this in turn, is going to be a debate about U.S. leadership in an everchanging world.<sup>60</sup>

"So the real issue," according to Clark, "is about national purpose and strategy, not about readiness."<sup>61</sup> Clark equates readiness with strategy, since for him it is the strategy (via the *National Security Strategy*, congressional and presidential requirements, war plans, and the like) which determines what "readiness" is, how it is measured, and what it is measured against.

Where the Army is concerned, one "measuring stick" is the responsibility assigned to the United States Army by law. Title 10 of the United States code codifies the responsibilities of the United States Army. The Army is to be capable of:

- (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
- (2) supporting the national policies;
- (3) implementing the national objectives; and
- (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.<sup>62</sup>

Further, under subsection (b) of 10 U.S.C. § 3062, the Army is to "be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land," and "responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war . . ."<sup>63</sup>

This is the origin of the Army's mission as the primary land warfare specialist of the United States Armed Forces. What is often missed are the provisions to "support national policies" and "implement national objectives," requirements which fall neatly in line with assigned

missions to perform peace operations. Given the breadth of the statute, the Army can be assigned to do about anything. This is not unwise: the Army is needed to protect and defend the United States, to maintain its security at home and abroad. It would be imprudent to legislate restrictions on the Army that would prevent it from being used to implement national objectives and support national policies.

Military planners must implement policy and strategic direction, developing operational military objectives that bridge the gap between strategic guidance and tactical action. That involves understanding all the articulated elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and utilization of those elements in mutual support of each other to attain national objectives. Understanding the world environment, the impact of globalization, and the interaction of the U.S. Department of State and other agencies contributing to the elements of the national power, is essential.

General Clark's identification of readiness as about "national purpose and strategy" is insightful. The realm of policy determines what we are trying to be ready for, thereby establishing a baseline for readiness based on national purpose and the strategy. National purpose and strategy for the United States, determined by political leaders in Congress and the Executive Branch of government, establish the missions of the Army and allocate resources for the accomplishment of those missions. Clausewitz agrees: "The political object -- the original motive for the war -- will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."<sup>64</sup>

## CHAPTER 3

### STRATEGY -- SHAPING THE SWORD

So policy converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a mere instrument. It changes the terrible battle-sword that a man needs both hands and his entire strength to wield, and with which he strikes home once and no more, into a light, handy rapier -- sometimes just a foil for the exchange of thrusts, feints and parries.<sup>65</sup>

-- Clausewitz, *On War*

#### INTRODUCTION

Political leaders seek policies to guide military options. Clausewitz acknowledges the role of policy to focus the power of the military, and its destructive capability, upon specific political ends. "It is clear," Clausewitz writes, "that war should never be thought of as *something autonomous* but always as an *instrument of policy*."<sup>66</sup> Congress and the President determine policy, and establish General Clark's "national purpose and strategy" which the military translates into objectives supportive of national policy.

One way the military tries to "weigh in" on the development of national strategy, and the use of the military as an implement of national power, is through the advice given the President by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,<sup>67</sup> and guidance within the *National Military Strategy*. At the strategic level, however, policy never separates from purpose. According to the most recent *National Military Strategy*, published in 1997 after the last Quadrennial Defense Review, the *National Military Strategy* is based on the *National Security Strategy*, and "describes the strategic environment, develops national military objectives and the strategy to accomplish those objectives, and describes the military capabilities required to execute the strategy."<sup>68</sup> For the United States,

“[t]he Armed Forces are the Nation’s military instrument for ensuring our security,” whose “foremost task is to fight and win our Nation’s wars.”<sup>69</sup> The relationship is one to be developed in concert with the full panoply of national power. “The military is a complementary element of national power that stands with the other instruments wielded by our government. The Armed Forces’ core competence is the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat aggression and achieve our national security objectives.”<sup>70</sup>

A need for the military to work hand-in-hand with policy makers is evident. Just what course to take in the 21st century is not as clear. Understanding how to develop a strategy for the use of national power in a world characterized by globalization and the absence of a monolithic Soviet threat is difficult. Like the Plataeans told the Spartans in Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*, the United States must “[r]emember, too, how incalculable the future is and how impossible it is to tell who next, however undeservedly, may be exposed to the blows of chance.”<sup>71</sup> The challenge for the military, and political leaders alike, is to predict that future as accurately as possible to allow effective planning, and use, of military forces.

There are no easy answers. General Clark also examined the challenges now confronting the military, and the U.S. Army specifically:

The Army is on the threshold of big things. Last fall, the Service launched an important transformation effort to make its fighting forces more rapidly deployable and lethal. Yet there are other changes equally important for the Army to consider as it looks forward. The national military strategy that underpins the Army’s program is beginning to crack at the seams, and the 21st century challenges the Service to consider a new mindset, think anew about how it develops officers, and assume a new willingness to undertake missions different than those the Army might prefer to take.<sup>72</sup>

Even as the Army and the rest of the military services struggle to evaluate the new environment of the 21st century, “there is a changing US national military strategy” brought about by international events.<sup>73</sup> In General Clark’s view,

The fall of the Berlin Wall brought an end to the Soviet Union as well as our decades-old policy of containment. In its place, we eventually adopted a strategy to prepare for two major regional contingencies; a posture based on force projection and force building. This policy never envisioned scenarios where US forces would deploy on prolonged commitments such as we now see in the Balkans; it was never intended to be a force-commitment strategy . . . The US Army and other forces were to prepare for two major theater wars. According to this planning, not only are these theaters -- Korea and the Middle East -- essentially the only places we are likely to fight, these scenarios are the only places we wanted to fight, the only places for which we could prepare to fight.<sup>74</sup>

Clark reasoned that the “two-war strategy” from the national command authority “shaped the ‘mission-essential’ task list crafted by our Army commanders at all levels” and contributed to an expectation that the primary focus for the United States’ armed forces was on major theaters of war rather than peace operations.<sup>75</sup> “And yet it’s clear after our recent experience in Kosovo,” writes Clark, “that this strategy [the two major theater of war strategy] is too tightly wound to deal with the actual requirements that are likely to face the US armed forces in the future.”<sup>76</sup>

The U.S. Congress, and the Executive Branch, appear to agree. The developing world situation has spawned two significant initiatives that may have immediate impact on the military: the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (also known as the “Hart-Rudman Commission” after Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, or simply as the “USCNS/21”), and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) No. 71 (PDD-71).<sup>77</sup> The Hart-Rudman Commission makes policy recommendations to guide U.S. security policy in the 21st century, while PDD-71 (titled “Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations”) follows a series of national security directives from the Executive Branch that establish further interagency

cooperation in peace operations to support government stability where military operations are necessary.

#### THE HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION

The Hart-Rudman Commission, created in 1998 by the Secretary of Defense under congressional authority (and endorsed by the White House and congressional leadership), was “established to examine comprehensively how this nation will ensure its security in the next 25 years, [and] has a threefold task.”<sup>78</sup> That task involved evaluating national security options for the United States, given by the Commission in three phased reports. “Phase I, completed on September 15, 1999, described the transformations emerging over the next quarter-century in the global and domestic U.S. security environment. Phase II, concerning U.S. interests, objectives, and strategy, is contained in this document [the Phase II report]. Phase III, which will examine the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus for 21st century relevancy, will be delivered on or before February 15, 2001.”<sup>79</sup> The Phase III final report promised in Phase II, titled *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, was published on January 31, 2001.<sup>80</sup>

Within the analysis accompanying its first published report, the Hart-Rudman Commission elaborated its view of the future:

The future, in essence, is this: The American “moment” in world politics, which combines bloodless victory in the final stage of the Cold War with the apparent global triumph of fundamental American ideals, will not last forever. Nothing wrought by man does. In the next 25 years, the United States will engage in an increasingly complex world to assure the benefits that we -- and most of the world with us -- derive from American leadership . . . [T]he world will not be tidily managed, whether from Washington or from anywhere else . . . [T]he challenges now being mounted to national authority and control -- if not to the national idea itself -- are both novel and mighty.<sup>81</sup>

This view of an uncertain future is consistent with concerns raised in the current *National Security Strategy*, with the Chairman's articulation of military needs in *Joint Vision 2020*, and with General Clark's thoughts on future military strategy. In General Clark's words:

The US is currently without a global peer competitor. But there are important US interests in many parts of the world beyond regions implied in the current national military strategy that may require American forces -- perhaps Taiwan, perhaps other places in the Middle East or the Balkans. Anyone who reads the newspaper these days might wonder if Colombia will require US military engagement. And the United States military must be prepared, for any of these or other places, to send air, maritime, or land forces to provide everything from advisory to logistics support, from training to direct involvement.<sup>82</sup>

General Clark also acknowledges the lack of a singular, clear threat and in its place the existence of multiple challenges, and a need for an "expeditionary" Army more responsive than the "'alert-trained-deployed' force that we used during the Gulf War and for Bosnia."<sup>83</sup> General Clark continues: "In the 21st century, I believe the US Army has to be ready for a 'come-as-you-are' commitment. Perhaps it will not be a war. Perhaps it will not be in Europe. But we have to be ready . . . versatile and flexible. And we have to be willing to go."<sup>84</sup>

The Phase I report of the Hart-Rudman Commission identified fourteen major themes and implications, "general conclusions about the world that is now emerging, and the American role in it for the next 25 years."<sup>85</sup> The major themes and implications from the Phase I report:

1. America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us.
2. Rapid advances in information and biotechnologies will create new vulnerabilities for U.S. strategy.
3. New technologies will divide the world as well as draw it together.
4. The national security of all advanced states will be increasingly affected by the vulnerabilities of the evolving global economic infrastructure.
5. Energy will continue to have major strategic significance.

6. All borders will be more porous; some will bend and some will break.
7. The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but will endure.
8. Fragmentation or failure of states will occur, with destabilizing effects on neighboring states.
9. Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations.
10. Space will become a critical and competitive military environment.
11. The essence of war will not change.
12. U.S. intelligence will face more challenging adversaries, and even excellent intelligence will not prevent all surprises.
13. The United States will be called upon frequently to intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances and with the prospect of fewer forward-deployed forces.
14. The emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different military and other national capabilities.<sup>86</sup>

These fourteen points established a baseline for the USCNS/21st Century's Phase II examination of national security options, and a blueprint of the 21st century environment for future military operations.

Within the Phase II report, the USCNS/21st Century identified the importance of "the economic dimensions of statecraft."<sup>87</sup> "Economic issues are also of critical importance to the prospect that other emerging or developing states will succeed or fail with fundamental social reform."<sup>88</sup> For the United States, "[a]ll this means that the integrating function of U.S. policymaking processes will be challenged as never before."<sup>89</sup> For the military, the Phase II report identified the need for a strategy with "five kinds of military capabilities: *nuclear* capabilities to deter and protect the United States and its allies from attack; *homeland security* capabilities; *conventional* capabilities necessary to win major wars; rapidly employable *expeditionary/intervention* capabilities; and *humanitarian relief* and *constabulary* capabilities."<sup>90</sup>

The Phase II report continues: "Fundamental to the U.S. national security strategy is the need to project U.S. power globally with forces stationed in the United States, and those stationed abroad and afloat in the forward presence role."<sup>91</sup> To effectively exercise military might within the five capabilities identified in the report, the U.S. military must:

[P]ossess greater flexibility to operate in a range of environments, including those in which the enemy has the capability to employ weapons of mass destruction. U.S. Forces must be characterized by stealth, speed, range, accuracy, lethality, agility, sustainability, reliability -- and be supported by superior intelligence -- in order to deal effectively with the spectrum of symmetrical and asymmetrical threats we anticipate over the next quarter century.<sup>92</sup>

Stealth, speed, range, accuracy, lethality, agility, sustainability, reliability, and superior intelligence -- all characteristics of the Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki's current force transformation program endorsed by General Clark in his "Turning Point" article -- comprise the essential hallmarks of military forces for the 21st century in the view of the Hart-Rudman Commission.

The Phase II report also recommended a departure from the *National Security Strategy's* two-major-theater-of-war method of allocating resources and analyzing military readiness:

This Commission believes that the "two major theater wars" yardstick for sizing U.S. forces is not producing the capabilities needed for the varied and complex contingencies now occurring and likely to increase in the years ahead. These contingencies, often calling for expeditionary interventions or stability operations, require forces different from those designed for major theater war. We believe these contingencies will occur in the future with sufficient regularity and simultaneity as to *oblige the United States to adapt portions of its force structure to meet those needs*. The overall force would then have the ability to engage effectively in contingencies ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peace and expeditionary combat operations, to large-scale, high-intensity conventional warfare. Finally, we recommend that the forces structure designed to address these needs be developed on the basis of real-world intelligence assessments rather than illustrative scenarios.<sup>93</sup>

The Hart-Rudman Commission suggests adaptation of a hybrid force structure to provide for a contingency operation capability useful in peace operations and humanitarian endeavors which

differs from traditional conventional capabilities associated with fighting major wars. “In short,” according to the report, “the capabilities mandated by these [the five] requirements will result in forces able to deploy rapidly, be employed immediately, and prevail decisively in expeditionary roles, prolonged stability operations, and major theater wars; a force to **deter** wars, to **preclude** crises from evolving into major conflicts, and to **win** wars rapidly and decisively should it become necessary.”<sup>94</sup> To develop the force structure of these new units, the report recommends using not an illustrative scenario like two major theaters of war in the Middle East or Korea, but validation of proposed structure based simply on real-world intelligence assessments.

The Phase III report states its recommendations up front in an “Executive Summary.”<sup>95</sup> As part of recommended “Institutional Redesign,” the report identifies the Department of State and the Department of Defense for overhaul.<sup>96</sup> “The Department of State, in particular, is a crippled institution, starved for resources by Congress because of its inadequacies, and thereby weakened further.”<sup>97</sup> As for the Department of Defense and the military, the report recommends cuts in staff for the Defense Department, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the regional commands, to “save money but also achieve the decision speed and encourage the decentralization necessary to succeed in the 21st century.”<sup>98</sup> The report also includes among its suggestions the utility of moving the QDR from the first year of a President’s term to the second to allow an incoming administration more time to “influence” the QDR and “gain a stake in its [the QDR’s] conclusions.”<sup>99</sup>

Two of the main recommendations from the Phase III report pertaining to the military concern the way “readiness,” or operational capability of the services, is measured, and the need for mobile forces. “The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD to shift from the threat-based, force sizing process to one which measures requirements against recent operational activity trends,

actual intelligence estimates of potential adversaries' capabilities, and national security objectives as defined in the new administration's national security strategy -- once formulated.”<sup>100</sup> Categories of Major Force Programs (MFPs) should be revised “to correspond with the five military capabilities the Commission prescribed in its Phase II report -- strategic nuclear forces, homeland security forces, conventional forces, expeditionary forces, and humanitarian and constabulary forces.”<sup>101</sup>

The Hart-Rudman Commission recommends that the “highest priority” be devoted to “improving and further developing its [the military’s] expeditionary capabilities.”<sup>102</sup> “Ultimately, the transformation process [of military forces] will blur the distinction between expeditionary and conventional forces, as both types of capabilities will eventually possess the technological superiority, deployability, survivability, and lethality now called for in the expeditionary forces. For the near term, however, those we call expeditionary capabilities require the most emphasis.”<sup>103</sup>

“The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century was chartered to provide the most comprehensive government-sponsored review of U.S. national security in more than 50 years.”<sup>104</sup> With the release of the final Phase III report immediately before the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), given the proximity of the QDR and the scope of the Hart-Rudman Commission’s mandate, the potential impact of the Commission and its work should not be underestimated. Congressional implementation of the Commission’s recommendations for change could restructure the military as we know it and impact policy in a manner approaching that of *Goldwater-Nichols*.

#### PDD-71 and PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVES

Presidential Decision Directives, orders from the President of the United States implementing National Security Council (NSC) policy, are another source of guidance for military

and civilian planners.<sup>105</sup> PDD-71, effective 24 February 2000, gives the U.S. State Department the lead in establishing a new program to train civilian police (CIVPOL) for international peacekeeping missions. A “white paper” from the executive branch describes the elements of PDD-71.<sup>106</sup> PDD-71 is part of a triumverate of PDDs (along with PDD-25 and PDD-56) aimed at improving the interaction of government agencies (State, Defense, and others) in the execution of missions supporting the policies of the United States. “The intent of PDD 71,” specifically, “is that the Executive Branch of the U.S. government improve its capacities to participate in rebuilding effective foreign criminal justice systems . . . and together with U.S. allies the Executive Branch shall seek to improve the capacities of other organizations to participate in these activities.”<sup>107</sup>

While the State Department retains the lead, PDD-71 places the initial responsibility for constabulary operations on U.S. military forces, and places operational control of paramilitary and military constabulatory forces under a military force commander. “Military or paramilitary forces,” under PDD-71, “are best suited to accomplish constabulary tasks.”<sup>108</sup> Though the stated preference is for paramilitary forces to perform constabulary tasks, under PDD-71 “U.S. military forces shall maintain the capability to support constabulary functions abroad, and if necessary carry out constabulary functions under limited conditions for a limited period of time.”<sup>109</sup> Despite identifying the primarily civilian character of constabulary activities, PDD-71 reasons that “the military component of peace operations does have a vital role to play in the overall recovery of criminal justice capacities.”<sup>110</sup> PDD-71, which is intended to be read in conjunction with PDD-25 (U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations) and PDD-56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations), establishes for the first time by policy the obligation of the military not only to directly manage paramilitary/CIVPOL constabulatory forces, but also to provide military constabulatory forces as part of peace operations.

The interrelationship between PDD-71, and PDDs 25 and 56, illustrates how national security directives build upon each other incrementally. It also shows the trend toward multi-disciplined approaches in peace operations where agencies of the United States government, including the military, are actively involved in nation-building.

The trend appearing in policy, which reflects the global environment of today, is toward increased usage of the military for peace operations. PDD-71 may be viewed as an already existing policy establishing, in part, the Hart-Rudman Commission recommendation for constabulatory forces within the military. PDD-71 also forces the issue of command and control with the State Department being given the lead in these types of peace operations, rather than the military. A more lasting consequence of this policy, however, is apparent: the Clinton Administration was planning on the robust use of military forces in peace operations to supervise and provide constabulatory forces in the long term. Frankly, with the military often being the only organization that can quickly deploy to an area and establish security, it is not surprising that a security mission falls upon the military. What is surprising is the later assumption of a long-term mission transcending the security role, and placing the military in a position of sustaining nation-building over time.

#### POLICY IMPLICATIONS

These policy initiatives show a U.S. Congress and executive branch moving toward establishing a new meaning for the idea of war as the continuation of policy by other means, using the war-making powers of the military to advance policy through an engagement strategy centered around peace operations. That is not to say that the military has not been used for peace operations in the past to facilitate engagement strategies and further the interests of the United States; it has. What appears to be changing, along with the global environment, is the frequency of those

operations, and the willingness of political leaders to deploy military forces for peace operations. The implications for the military are inherent. Potential changes in military structure and mission are not just implicit, but often explicit. The Hart-Rudman Commission recommends a military structured to accomplish nuclear deterrence; homeland security (a mission currently given to the National Guard within the *National Security Strategy*, rather than active forces),<sup>111</sup> retain a conventional capability to win major theater war; perform expeditionary intervention operations with rapidly-deployable, decisive forces; and also maintain forces for humanitarian relief and constabulatory duties.

Aside from these other implications for change, language used both by the Hart-Rudman Commission and in PDDs such as PDD-71 highlight the dilemma facing military planners and service chiefs alike: prepare specially tailored forces for an increasing number of peace operations, but retain the capability to do all the things you have always done, and do it with less money and less resources while maintaining the best military in the world.

With reserve forces being called upon in increasing numbers to support the missions given military leaders, it is not far-fetched to ask the “what if” questions and look to possible ways in which these proposed policies can be implemented. Should the United States military create units specially tailored for peace missions like some Scandinavian countries? Should the United States refrain from deploying traditional active forces abroad for peace operations and instead use personnel who have volunteered to serve as part of specially tailored peace forces? Or would the best course be to fall back on an old “strategy” used by military leaders in dealing with policy makers: “You tell us [the military] what you want to do and we’ll tell you what the bills is”?<sup>112</sup>

## CHAPTER 4

### WIELDING THE SWORD

No man can have in his mind a conception of the future, for it is not yet. But of our own conceptions of the past we make a future.<sup>113</sup>

-- Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*

#### INTRODUCTION

Long ago, Clausewitz made one of his many comments on political-military interaction. “Political considerations,” wrote Clausewitz, “do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.”<sup>114</sup> In the 21st century those political considerations have enjoyed expanded influence in an interconnected world, reflecting a process popularly described as “globalization.” Military forces, assigned to do the nation’s bidding, are operating in that new world. Still, like Hobbes, a look to the past helps formulate a vision of the future. Within that past are demonstrated trends of unreadiness for U.S. military forces.

Evolving U.S. policy trends present in the reports of the Hart-Rudman Commission and the issuance of PDDs seem to be moving toward increased military force deployment for peace missions. Naysayers of such trends may argue the pace of peace deployments runs contrary to the main purpose of the military to fight and win the nation’s wars, and adversely impacts the ability of the military to provide for the security of the United States in the long-term. Given concerns raised by the Hart-Rudman Commission as to future global stability, however, is the U.S. military

on track to provide the full spectrum dominance anticipated by the strategy articulated in *Joint Vision 2020*?

## EVALUATION

The following criteria have been formulated to examine U.S. strategy, and the recommended military forces to accomplish that strategy: power projection, dominance, engagement, and domestic integrity. The criteria are listed and defined below, and associated with their relevance to analysis:

(1) Power Projection. This criterion is defined as the ability to decisively<sup>115</sup> respond to an MTW mission while also engaged in peace operations. This supports overall diplomatic efforts with the credible deterrent of military force as part of the DIME (the elements of national power expressed as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power); helps ensure stability internationally; and enables protection of U.S. interests abroad.

(2) Dominance. This criterion is defined as the ability of the military to maintain the edge in the employment of military force through advanced technology in information and weaponry. It suggests superior capability over that of our potential enemies, measured against likely actual threats as suggested by the Hart-Rudman Commission, rather than scenarios. Dominance implies the existence of that superiority in maneuver, and through precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and other elements of joint dominance as envisioned by *Joint Vision 2020*.

(3) Engagement. This criterion is defined as the capability to conduct multiple peace operations, stability operations, and support operations simultaneously. This includes maintaining the capability to perform constabulatory operations in support of requirements such as PDD-71. Engagement strategies are an integral part of the current *National Security Strategy* and developing

national strategy as suggested by the Hart-Rudman Commission, and are part of fundamental U.S. interests such as promoting democracy abroad.

(4) Domestic Integrity. This criterion is defined as the ability to respond to domestic security needs such as protection of critical infrastructure, internal and external domestic terrorism, and natural disasters. Threats to the United States proper are anticipated to be among the most dangerous threats of the 21st century.

These criteria are consistent with required military force capabilities anticipated for use in the future environment as suggested by both the Hart-Rudman Commission and *Joint Vision 2020*.

#### ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The criteria identified (power projection, dominance, engagement, domestic integrity) could easily have been drafted by the Hart-Rudman Commission. As an evaluative tool, they fit neatly within the “five kinds of military capabilities” recommended in the Commission’s Phase II report and reaffirmed in the Phase III final report. They also represent a mode of examination that looks to the types of capabilities discussed by General Clark in his quoted writings.

**Power Projection.** In examining the capabilities of current and future military forces of the United States, and the ability to decisively respond to missions in a major theater of war (MTW) while engaged in peace operations simultaneously, certain assumptions about the required military capability of the United States will have to be made. The need to retain the capability to perform warfighting missions in an MTW will remain, and is consistent with the recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission and its identification of the five kinds of military capabilities. Whether that conventional capability remains focused on only one theater, two theaters, or some other number of near-simultaneous theaters is subject to change.

International commitments abroad, including treaty promises and ongoing operations in areas of the world such as Korea and the Middle East (the two principal regions where MTW requirements are currently postulated) will not likely allow the U.S. to abrogate the two MTW model any time soon. A declaration by the United States that it is no longer capable of mounting operations in two near-simultaneous MTWs, or an abandonment of that position through its actions or policy statements, is not without risk. Potential enemies, whether legitimate threats to U.S. Security or simply nation-state opportunists, may seize upon any perceived weakness in the American arsenal. The United States risks losing the deterrent effect of its military power, impacting diplomatic initiatives, and perhaps causing a decline from “superpower” leadership status.

Still entrenched within Betts’ paradigm of cold war mobilization, the existing forces of the U.S. military are not capable of executing decisive operations in two near-simultaneous MTWs while also engaged in multiple, long-term deployments for peace operations. “The luxuries of time and distance the United States Army once enjoyed,” for example, “no longer can serve as brakes on the requirements for rapid deployment of forces and their possible use in widely spread theaters of operation across the spectrum of conflict. The Army may no longer proceed to battle on its own timetable.”<sup>116</sup> That the Army itself requires a more deployable force structure, more lethality, and an expeditionary capability is consistent with the previously expressed views of General Clark, the Hart-Rudman Commission, and evident in General Shinseki’s quest for transformation of Army forces.

**Dominance.** From within, the U.S. military is well on its way to ensuring dominance. *Joint Vision 2020*, guiding the formation of military thought, is a document *based* on the idea of dominance. *Joint Vision 2020* emphasizes full spectrum dominance through joint action. The tradition of American military culture discussed earlier, embodied in an annihilation strategy

present in military operations since Ulysses S. Grant commanded during the Civil War, helped to establish dominance as a recurring military theme. The United States, supported by triumph in the Gulf War and recently through the spectacular display of air power during the war in Kosovo, has cemented recognition of U.S. military dominance.

Dominance in the 21st century implies the existence of an edge which can be lost. Failure to exploit technological advances or develop forces that can be used decisively may result in the loss of dominance. At the other extreme, over-investment in military capability can also have a negative impact, as proved by economic decline and the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To a large extent, however, given the role of advanced weaponry and technology dominance can be said to be resource driven. As discussed earlier in this monograph, resources are limited, and political authority that may wish to maintain a capability to wield the dominant sword of annihilation does not always provide the resources to achieve that end. Policy must provide a balanced answer to resource questions.

A Hobbesian glance at the past shows how military resource limitations may be justified by political leaders. Accompanying the United States' tradition of unreadiness spoken of by Betts is an antithetical view that the United States was never actually unready for war, but rather "that the United States was as ready as it needed to be."<sup>117</sup> "The military's depressing record in initial combat had two edges: a high price in war and a low price in peace."<sup>118</sup> In a purely economic sense, the debate over "guns or butter" may favor "butter" where vital U.S. interests are not at stake, and public and congressional support for military expenditures is lacking.<sup>119</sup> "For each year of high wartime expenditures [by the United States], there were many more years of low peacetime defense budgets. The United States did not lose in either Korea or Kuwait. The difference was that it paid with a little extra blood after the outbreak of war in Korea, whereas it

paid with a great many extra dollars before the outbreak of war over Kuwait. Total U.S. military expenditures in the course of the cold war were close to \$12 trillion (in 1994 U.S. dollars).<sup>120</sup>

The “new” tradition of cold war mobilization identified by Betts was economically a much larger problem for the United States following the Korean War. Fortunately, during this period the United States also faced no peer economic competitors, a marked advantage. “After 1950,” according to Betts, “the United States lived in an environment of permanent military mobilization.”<sup>121</sup> “Whereas traditional unreadiness had been an economic bargain when other great powers could hold the line while the United States mobilized for war,” reasons Betts, “the new commitment to readiness posed an economic burden. The United States came to bear military costs in peacetime several times higher than they had ever been in the past.”<sup>122</sup> United States commitment to maintaining an international military presence abroad, and policy trends supporting technologically advanced, lethal forces with enhanced power-projection capabilities, will require larger peacetime military expenditures.

In the 21st century, allocating resources for research and development, and for equipment advancing a dominance capability, is essential. Policy makers must make the transition to the 21st century along with the military, and fund programs enhancing the technological superiority of American military forces. In the words of General Clark: “We need a bipartisan consensus on America’s role and strategy in the world. Then we need to direct that the armed forces be structured, equipped and trained for the missions expected . . . It means lighter weight, more mobile forces and increased investment in high technology. It also means more efficient, streamlined training. And it probably means some additional funding and personnel.”<sup>123</sup> For dominance to succeed, not only the military, but policy makers also, must be committed to the

procurement of advanced weapons systems and information technology that will ensure the United States maintains an edge over its potential foes.

**Engagement.** The fundamental strategy adopted by the United States is one of *engagement*. “Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. engagement and leadership abroad. The United States must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home.”<sup>124</sup> Advancing American interests in the world through leadership was one of the major justifications for involvement in peace operations in the Balkans. Through a U.S. strategy of engagement, “[b]y exerting our leadership abroad we have deterred aggression, fostered the resolution of conflicts, enhanced regional cooperation, strengthened democracies, stopped human rights abuses, opened foreign markets and tackled global problems such as preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, protected the environment, and combated international corruption.”<sup>125</sup> To lead the United States must “devote the necessary resources to military, diplomatic, intelligence, and other efforts.”<sup>126</sup>

Diplomatic efforts toward engagement have been strengthened, at least in theory, by the creation of PDD-25, PDD-56, and PDD-71. These presidential decision directives established structures for interagency coordination and advanced cooperative measures among government agencies for peace operations, including the military. The relative world stability enjoyed since the fall of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War would seem to support the idea that a U.S. engagement strategy involving all the elements of national power, and using the military for a record number of peace operations, has been successful.

One area of contention concerns the impact that these peace operations have had on the ability of U.S. military forces to perform traditional “warfighting” missions. In General Clark’s view, “We’ve got to have both a warfighting spirit and a peacekeeping capability if we’re going to

be successful.”<sup>127</sup> Have peace operations hurt our ability to accomplish traditional warfighting missions?

A recent study on peace operations was commissioned by General Joseph W. Ralston, who followed General Clark as the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR). The study was conducted for General Ralston by Dr. Charles Moskos of Northwestern University. Dr. Moskos’ “report is based on a variety of methods: field observations, in-depth interviews, and a survey of 320 soldiers.”<sup>128</sup> Among his topics Dr. Moskos examined the perceived impact of peace keeping operations on the warfighting capabilities of deployed forces. In Moskos’ words: “There has been concern recently that peacekeeping operations may undermine combat capabilities. Although I cannot give a final answer to this question, this is not a view shared by the soldiers of Task Force Falcon. The overwhelming consensus is that what is lost in weapons practice and field exercises is more than compensated for by real-life experience in small unit operations.”<sup>129</sup> Moskos continues: “As a senior commander put it, if soldiers after a peacekeeping deployment need months of combat retraining when they return to their home station, ‘they weren’t well trained to begin with.’”<sup>130</sup>

Though controversy still remains, prior academic research on this subject supports Dr. Moskos’ recent findings. Peace operations do not necessarily degrade the overall effectiveness of U.S. combat forces, especially if emphasis is placed on providing training opportunities that minimize any needed retraining time. Major Robert Botters, reviewing available data in a monograph titled “The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?”, addressed this issue. “Evidence suggests,” says Botters, that “units trained and organized for combat operations can maintain core competencies in warfighting skills while participating in peace operations if provided adequate *resources* for

training perishable collective warfighting skills . . . Tactical forces organized with a combat task organization can maintain an ability to transition from peace operations to warfighting operations and vice-versa.”<sup>131</sup> An exhaustive master’s thesis on peace operations and warfighting capability also reaches a similar conclusion, and reasons that involvement in peace operations can actually *enhance* military capability: “[I]f properly exploited, *peace operations can provide valuable preparation for future wars* [as] [s]uch operations exercise a broad set of capabilities -- particularly in the areas of command and control, planning, logistics, deployment, intelligence, and small unit tasks -- that are *essential to the effectiveness across the range of military operations.*”<sup>132</sup>

There is an art to military planning, in deciding how to best use the capabilities of the U.S. military in furthering national interests. “There is no timeless recipe for [use of] a military force,” says General Clark.<sup>133</sup> Engagement strategies involving the use of military forces in peace operations are an integral part of the *National Security Strategy* and recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission. According to a RAND study:

*U.S. military involvement in future operations other than war (OOTW) is inevitable*, whether or not peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance remain fashionable missions. OOTW have been conducted throughout the history of the U.S. military, first within the continental United States, and then outside U.S. borders. Even after failed or controversial operations -- such as the nineteen-year nation-building effort in Haiti, efforts during the early years of the Vietnam War, peacekeeping in Beirut as part of Multinational Force 2, the disastrous Desert One operation, support for the Contras in Nicaragua, training the Salvadoran military, and more recently, the peace enforcement operation in Somalia -- civilian decisionmakers repeatedly turn to the U.S. military to create solutions for international crises or dilemmas that economic sanctions and diplomacy have proved unable to resolve. *Simply put, because no other U.S. agency is comparably equipped, manned, managed, or funded, the U.S. military must be prepared for these missions.*<sup>134</sup>

Given the international environment, the U.S. Army must be prepared to participate in national engagement strategies, and conduct peace operations. “When you’re a soldier,” says General

Clark, "you serve where your country needs you -- you don't pick and choose -- and you succeed -- whatever the mission, wherever you are needed."<sup>135</sup>

Resource constraints will also remain an issue for the military within an engagement strategy. If the U.S. Army wants to remain relevant, it must be prepared to accept the missions that are given, including peace missions, and not just the missions the Army wants. "If we want to be there in the future, then we've got to want to be used in the future. If we don't go for the missions, then we won't get the resources."<sup>136</sup>

**Domestic Integrity.** The *National Security Strategy* places great importance on domestic security. "At home, we must have effective capabilities for thwarting and responding to terrorist acts, countering international crime and foreign intelligence collection, and protecting critical national infrastructures."<sup>137</sup> To counter those threats, the *National Security Strategy* envisions "close cooperation among Federal agencies, state and local governments, the industries that own and operate critical national infrastructures, non-governmental organizations, and others in the private sector."<sup>138</sup> The final report of the Hart-Rudman Commission also places significant emphasis on the United States being better prepared to face greater challenges to its domestic security.<sup>139</sup>

The military will play a significant role in ensuring domestic integrity. "Our potential enemies, whether nations or terrorists, may be more likely in the future to resort to attacks against vulnerable civilian targets . . . [a]dversaries may be tempted to use long-range ballistic missiles or unconventional tools, such as WMD [weapons of mass destruction], financial destabilization, or information attacks, to threaten our citizens and critical national infrastructures at home."<sup>140</sup> Combating potential domestic threats will involve a concerted effort between civilian agencies and the military.

There are no easy answers to U.S. domestic security concerns in the 21st century. Security abroad, in a synergistic way, also promotes security at home. Military capabilities for power projection, full-spectrum dominance, and engagement enhance that security by providing credible deterrence and the capability for response. In conjunction with civilian efforts, including those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other U.S. and local agencies, overall security is increased. Challenges do remain, however. “It is not going to be enough to add to the repertoire homeland defense, national missile defense, and anti-terrorism measures, as has been recently discussed. We’ve got to recognize that US military power will be required outside our borders and probably in unforeseen circumstances. And I think this is inevitable. We can’t just prepare for the last wars, or the battles we want to fight.”<sup>141</sup> Utilizing U.S. military power outside the borders of the United States implies further force deployments in support of stability operations world-wide as part of engagement strategy.

## CONCLUSION

The environment of the 21st century is complex. Globalization has resulted in increased political, economic, and social interdependence. The use of military force remains effective, but the character of the international environment and the existence of expanded mass-media coverage with 24-hour news has created a sensitivity not unlike that of Europe in the 1700s. “Political relations, with their affinities and antipathies,” said Clausewitz, “had become so sensitive a nexus that no cannon could be fired in Europe without every government feeling its interest affected. Hence a new Alexander needed more than his own sharp sword: he required a ready pen as well.”<sup>142</sup>

National security policy provides the pen which complements the sword. The United States is facing a critical point in its history as it begins the 21st century. Its military forces have been asked to participate in increasing numbers of peace operations in an effort to enhance the security of the United States through a strategy of engagement. Military involvement in peace operations as part of that engagement strategy is a legitimate, and wise, use of forces provided warfighting capabilities of the United States military are not unreasonably compromised. The sharp sword of the United States has not been blunted. The available evidence suggests that deployment on peace operations does not have a significant long-term negative effect on military “readiness.” While the effect of peace operations on combat readiness remains a contentious issue, the impact also depends on other variables such as resources. As a consequence of peace operations and the increased OPTEMPO of U.S. forces, more care must be taken to train core warfighting competencies, and the size of available forces must be able to sustain deployments for multiple peace operations while maintaining the capability to decisively win combat engagements in major theaters of war. The rotation of forces performing in peace operations or other contingency missions, where one unit is deployed on a peace operation, another is preparing to go and one has returned and is focusing on another mission, should not be forgotten as it raises significant “readiness” issues.

The other elements of national power are all supported by the military. A return to a military tradition of “unreadiness” by political leaders could have disastrous consequences, especially within the environment of globalization. As suggested by Hobbes, an examination of the past helps avoid future mistakes. For example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, which crippled the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet, illustrates the strategic consequence of military unreadiness when other elements of national power fail. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor occurred after U.S. application of economic power against Japan provoked a preemptive Japanese

attack. “The United states therefore applied an ascending series of economic penalties against Japan, which finally provoked the Japanese into attacking the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor. This attack was intended to clear the way for Japan’s forcible acquisition both of required resources in Indonesia and of a Pacific island empire to shield the Japanese homeland and Japan’s Asian conquests from American wrath.”<sup>143</sup> Effective use of a “ready” military adequately prepared and resourced, used in concert with the other elements of national power, provides formidable tools for a United States facing the 21st century.

Determining the size of the force structure needed by the military for the 21st century should take into account the international commitments of the United States and an appropriate number of probable MTWs. This is a policy decision. The Hart-Rudman Commission’s recommendation that force structure decisions be based on the actual threat environment is reasonable. Moreover, given that recommendation and the likelihood of further involvement in increasing numbers of peace operations in the 21st century, resources allocated to the military should reflect increases commensurate with the number and variety of missions the military is being asked to perform. On the resource issue, General Clark has this to say:

This is, in part, about money. In an economy ripe with budget surplus, let’s not impose a false parsimony on those men and women who have volunteered to put their lives on the line for us. We should provide the resources the armed forces need to do their job and provide service members and their families with a standard of living that reflects the wealth of this nation. *We can afford it.*<sup>144</sup>

Policy decisions determine resources, and establish what “readiness” is by defining the scope of missions the military is to perform within the Title 10 mandate of the United States Code. Adequate resourcing is a necessity for the military to effectively exercise dominance, project power, and assist with engagement strategies and domestic security. The 2001 QDR, the Bush Administration’s formulation of a new *National Security Strategy*, and policy recommendations

advanced by the Hart-Rudman Commission will have a major impact on the operational tools available to military commanders in the foreseeable future.

For U.S. policy in the 21st century to be successful, the United States must lead effectively. To lead effectively involves a commitment of resources beyond that currently involved. "Don't think America can lead and influence events around the world," says General Clark, "if it doesn't pull its weight in the difficult work of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and participation in other international institutions. Leadership is not just about reacting to aggression once it occurs -- it's about preventing it where we can, helping others in need and supporting those who share our values."<sup>145</sup> The United States must be willing to use its status in the world to lead, and not shy away from employing its military forces in peace operations or in decisive response to challenges of the 21st century. For deterrence to maintain peace, and help ensure security and stability in the world, the United States must be prepared to wield the sharp sword of its military. "War gives peace its security, but one is still not safe from danger if, for the sake of quiet, one refuses to fight."<sup>146</sup>

## ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors) (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 260.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 75. To reach the idea that “war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” in Book One, Chapter One, of On War, Clausewitz describes war as a “duel on a larger scale,” with “countless duels go[ing] to make up war.” To view the series of duels on the whole, he suggests viewing war as two wrestlers engaged in the act of trying to throw their “opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.” “Each tries,” in Clausewitz’s words, “through physical force to compel the other to do his will.”
4. *Ibid.*, p. 87. Clausewitz makes this statement after reasoning that “[w]ar, therefore, is an act of policy.”
5. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999), p. 1.
6. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), p. 7.
7. *National Security Strategy (1999)*, p. 1.
8. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998), p. 23.
9. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstks, Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare -- Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (Washington, D.C.: CCRP Publication, 2d ed. (rev.), August 1999), p. 60.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
11. *Joint Vision 2020 -- America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow* (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2000), p. 4. *Joint Vision 2020* was also published in an issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*. See “JV 2020: America’s Military Preparing for Tomorrow,” *Joint Force Quarterly No. 25* (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for National and Strategic Studies National Defense University, Summer 2000).
12. Executive Summary, “American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century” (Center for Strategic and International Studies website ([www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org)), February 2000), p. 3. This is the executive summary of the CSIS report released in February, 2000. Site accessed July 18, 2000.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

14. *Joint Vision 2020*, p. 1.

15. *National Security Strategy (1998)*, op.cit., p. 12.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 12-13.

17. *National Security Strategy (1999)*, p. 11.

18. *Ibid.*

19. The author is mindful that a new administration is now in the White House, and that pursuant to law a new *National Security Strategy* will be forthcoming. The Bush Administration is also conducting its own internal review of force structure and military missions even as the Quadrennial Defense Review process begins. The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, popularly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after the two U.S. Senators who chair the commission, has also released the third and final of its reports (January 31, 2001) dealing with security issues for the new century and making recommendations for future military and engagement policy. (The Hart-Rudman report is discussed at some length later in this monograph.) All these initiatives will impact the eventual shape and scope of security policy during the next four years and beyond. It remains relevant, however, to still examine the current *National Security Strategy* which even now continues to inform policy and impact the use of military power.

20. *National Security Strategy (1999)*, op cit., p. 11.

21. *Ibid.* The responsibility for engagement planning falls on the theater CINC (commander-in-chief), the military officer responsible for joint military forces in a geographic area of the world under an assigned unified command structure. In military parlance, this is now known as the TEP (theater engagement plan), and is essentially a codification of a prior unwritten requirement placed upon CINCs. CINCs work not only in the military realm, but also in the political-military interaction of engagement strategies (along with ambassadors). They help orchestrate paths through the complexities of coalition and multi-national integration of forces under commands such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For more discussion of the evolution of unified commands, see Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1995).

22. The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressional requirement. Title 10 of the United States Code, Section 118 (10 U.S.C. § 118), establishes the requirement for a quadrennial review of defense capabilities. The Quadrennial Defense Review is a requirement for a “comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense programs for the next 20 years.”

23. The “Moskos Report” is an unpublished study by Charles C. Moskos, sociology professor at Northwestern University, commissioned by General Joseph W. Ralston, the SACEUR (Supreme

Allied Commander for Europe). (General Ralston followed General Wesley Clark, who held the position of SACEUR immediately prior.) Dated October 21, 2000, the study discusses Task Force Falcon, and looks at readiness and other issues related to leadership, morale, and perceived warfighting capability of troops in the Balkans. Professor Moskos has written on similar topics before. See Charles C. Moskos, David R. Segal, and John Allen Williams, editors, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) (discussing the sociological underpinnings of modern military forces).

24. Michael Grant, The Army of the Caesars (New York, New York: Scribner, 1974), p. xxvii.

25. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War -- A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973, 1977 ed.), p. xxii.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*, p. xx.

28. *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

29. Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," *International Security Vol. 7, No. 2* (Fall, 1982), pp. 83-113. The author recognizes that while the concept of a limited war as the United States thinks of it today is based on experiences in Korea and Vietnam, hence the statement of limited war as not originating until after 1950, the writings of Sir John Corbett in the early part of the 20th century introduced and expanded on the concept of limited wars.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

31. *National Security Strategy* (1999), p. 18.

32. Rosen, op cit., p. 84.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.* Emphasis in the quote has been added.

35. Clausewitz, op cit., pp. 590-593. Clausewitz discusses historical uses of "battles and sieges" among European powers prior to 1793 to accomplish limited political gains and assist in negotiation and diplomacy, contrasted with the peoples' war of Napoleon, "war waged with the full resources of the state."

36. *National Security Strategy* (1999), p. iii.

37. *Ibid.*

38. S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press, University of Oklahoma Press edition, 2000), p. 19.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

40. Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 4.

41. Betts, op cit., p. 5.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 5. Betts uses as his source the book America's First Battles: 1776-1865, at p. 329, a source which is quoted later in this monograph. The battles which were losses: Long Island, Queenston, Bull Run, Kasserine, and Osan/Naktong. The costly victories: San Juan, Cantigny, Buna, and Ia Drang.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11, 15-16.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-19.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*

56. On several occasions Betts mentions the complexity of measuring readiness. The Army, and the military, also attempt to "quantify" readiness. For example, the "Unit Status Report," or USR, from *Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting*, is an example of an attempt at quantification. Nevertheless, even *AR 220-1* identifies the problem with simple numerical readiness. "Unit status reports are designed to measure the status of resources and training of a unit at a given point in time. The report should not be used in isolation when assessing overall unit readiness or in the broader aspect of Army readiness." *AR 220-1* (1 September 1997), ¶ 1-5, a(1). Even when

numbers are provided, subjectivity remains. “Each commander also determines an overall unit status level based on a combination of the unit’s measured resources areas and his professional judgment. Remarks will be submitted to clarify category levels.” *AR 220-1*, ¶ 1-6, a.

57. Wesley K. Clark, “Ready for What?”, *Washington Post*, September 8, 2000.

58. See Endnote 55. Based on their professional judgment the commanders were able to make a determination that their units were not ready to be used in other wartime missions. General Clark reasons that this was a glitch in reporting, an “administrative quirk.” Regardless of the numbers, however, or the additional peace keeping missions the troops were involved in, the commanders responsible for those units reported them unready for combat. This highlights a readiness issue, and the dilemma for military commanders who must execute missions given by National Command Authority, including peace missions, while still striving to maintain the capability to execute other missions with more of a warfighting focus.

59. Clark, “Ready for What?”, op cit.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*

62. 10 U.S.C. § 3062(a), (a)(1) through (a)(4).

63. 10 U.S.C. § 3062(b).

64. Clausewitz, op cit., p. 81.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 606.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 88. The emphasis within the quotation is Clausewitz’s own, contained in the original.

67. Pursuant to the *Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (popularly known as *Goldwater-Nichols*), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 151, *et seq.*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became by law the principal military advisor to the President of the United States on military affairs. As advisor to the President, the Chairman has direct access to the President outside of the otherwise established chain-of-command. Within the chain-of-command, the military Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) heading the combatant commands respond only to the National Command Authority (NCA) (the President and the Secretary of Defense), not the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. With *Goldwater-Nichols*, the Chairman’s right for a direct say in military affairs was formally established. The Chairman now has a legal duty to comment and advise the President, notwithstanding potentially conflicting views of the service chiefs (Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Army, etc.) or the CINCs. While any savvy Chairman would logically take note of the views of the service chiefs and the CINCs, *Goldwater-Nichols* was revolutionary in codifying the Chairman’s role in law as the principal advisor to the President, giving the Chairman the ability to exert great influence on policy through direct interaction with the President and the Executive Branch.

68. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1997), p. 5.

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*

71. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (London, England: Penguin Group, 1972), p. 229.

72. Wesley K. Clark, "Turning Point," *Armed Forces Journal International* (McLean, Virginia: Armed Forces Journal International, Inc., June 2000), p. 84.

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Ibid.*

76. *Ibid.*

77. These new initiatives followed other policy events in the 1990s. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review of military forces instituted after the Gulf War, the QDR in 1997, and the 1997 Report of the National Defense Panel, all preceded the 1998 formation of the Commission on National Security in the 21st Century under charter from the Secretary of Defense. For more information on the report of the National Defense Panel, see Report of the National Defense Panel, "Transforming Defense -- National Security in the 21st Century" (Arlington, Virginia: The National Defense Panel, December 1997).

78. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom* (Phase II report on a U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century) (The United States Commission on National Security Strategy/21st Century website ([www.nssg.gov](http://www.nssg.gov)), April 15, 2000), p. 5, footnote 1. Accessed September 4, 2000.

79. *Ibid.*

80. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change* (Phase III report on a U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century) (The United States Commission on National Security Strategy/21st Century website ([www.nssg.gov](http://www.nssg.gov)), January 31, 2001). Accessed February 1, 2001.

81. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Supporting Research and Analysis* (Phase I report on a

U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century) (The United States Commission on National Security Strategy/21st Century website ([www.nssg.gov](http://www.nssg.gov)), September 15, 1999), p. 1. Accessed September 4, 2000.

82. Clark, "Turning Point," op cit., p. 84.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

84. *Ibid.*

85. The USCNS/21st Century, Phase I report, *Supporting Research and Analysis*, op cit., p. 138.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-42. Extensive discussion of the fourteen points identified in the Phase I report of the USCNS/21st Century, and the rationale for their advancement, is beyond the scope of this monograph. The reader is invited to examine the ample evidence contained in Phase I's *Supporting Research and Analysis* volume, which provides supporting data for the conclusions of the Phase I report.

87. USCNS/21st Century, Phase II report, op cit., p. 14.

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Ibid.*

90. *Ibid.* The emphasis in the text is in the original report.

91. *Ibid.*

92. *Ibid.*

93. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15. Italics in the quote text was added by the author for emphasis, and was not in the original.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 15. Bold emphasis is in the original text.

95. USCNS/21st Century, Phase III report, op cit., pp. vii to xviii (Executive Summary).

96. *Ibid.*, pp. x to xiv.

97. *Ibid.*, p. x. The Phase III report makes sweeping recommendations for the restructuring of the U.S. Department of State and changes in the way funds are budgeted for the Department of State. Lengthy discussion of those changes are outside the scope of this monograph, but the interested reader is invited to read the *Executive Summary* of the Phase III report, and the recommendations also contained in the body of the final report.

98. *Ibid.*, p. xii.

99. *Ibid.*

100. *Ibid.*, p. xiii. Bold italics found in the original source, which emphasized the entire quotation, has been omitted.

101. *Ibid.*

102. *Ibid.*

103. *Ibid.*

104. USCNS/21st Century, Phase II report (Supporting Research and Analysis), *op cit.*, p. v. The Commission was to take a sweeping look at the requirements and challenges of the new century, and recommend changes in national security policy on a scale not unlike that of the *National Security Act of 1947*.

105. Orders from the President of the United States establishing formal guidance related to national security policy through written directives are Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs). PDDs, as they were known during the Clinton presidency, have been identified by different names during the administrations of different Presidents. For example, during the Eisenhower Administration they were simply identified as NSC (National Security Council) orders. The Carter Administration called them PDs (Presidential Directives). President Reagan issued NSDDs (National Security Decision Directives), and President Bush NSDs (National Security Directives). The Bush Administration is free to utilize the designation of its predecessor (PDDs), or create some other title for the orders.

106. The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations -- “Rebuilding Effective Foreign Criminal Justice Systems” (Washington, D.C: The White House, February 24, 2000).

107. *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 2.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

109. *Ibid.*

110. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

111. Assignment of the National Guard, or other reserve components of the military, to duties in support of “homeland defense” (or “domestic support to civilian authorities,” which is the politically correct term) is an appropriate mission given the reserve components’ habitual relationship with local and state governments, and state and federal agencies responding to domestic emergencies. However, with the National Guard being called upon to undertake a larger share of the defense responsibilities of the Army, as in commitment of Guard divisions to assist with the Bosnia mission, the evolution of a “borrowing from Peter to pay Paul” situation may be arising.

112. Clark, "Turning Point," op cit., p. 85.

113. USCNS/21st Century, Phase II report (Supporting Research and Analysis), op cit., p. 2. As stated, the quote is from Thomas Hobbes' classic book *Leviathan*, first published in London in 1651. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1950).

114. Clausewitz, op cit., p. 606.

115. There are many definitions for "decisive." Within this criterion the term "decisive" is used in the simple sense of attaining the military objective supportive of the political purpose, and accomplishing Clausewitz's goal of forcing the enemy to accept defeat.

116. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, editors, America's First Battles: 1776-1965 (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1986), p. xi.

117. Betts, op cit., p. 13.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

119. The *National Security Strategy* of the United States defines the national interests of the United States. For the purposes of U.S. strategy, the interests of the United States "fall into three categories." There are "vital interests -- those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation"; "important national interests, which remain important to "national well-being and the character of the world we live in" but "do not affect our national survival"; and "humanitarian and other interests," interests where the U.S. acts because our values demand action, such as in "responding to natural and manmade disasters," "promoting human rights," and "supporting democratization." Vital interests include the physical security of the United States, the safety of its citizens, U.S. economic well-being, and other interests which must be defended "when necessary and appropriate, using our military might unilaterally and decisively." See *National Security Strategy (1999)*, op cit., pp. 1-2. One of the arguments against increased use of U.S. military forces for peace operations is based on a view that many of the peace operations the United States has participated in have not involved vital U.S. interests.

120. Betts, op cit., p. 14.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

122. *Ibid.*

123. Clark, "Ready for What?", op cit.

124. *National Security Strategy (1999)*, op cit., p. 3.

125. *Ibid.*

126. *Ibid.*

127. Clark, "Turning Point," op cit., p. 85.

128. Charles C. Moskos, "Report on Task Force Falcon" (Field Research Report Memorandum, prepared for General Joseph W. Ralston, SACEUR, October 21, 2000). As mentioned in endnote 23, this report has yet to be formally published. The report was the result of field work conducted in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo between August 30th and September 6th, 2000.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

130. *Ibid.*

131. Major Robert J. Botters, Jr., "The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced military Studies Monograph, December 1995), p. 41, 43. The emphasis in the quote has been added.

132. Major Mark S. Martins, "The 'Small Change' of Soldiering? / Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars," (M.M.A.S. thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1998), p. 174. Emphasis has been added.

133. Clark, "Turning Point," op cit., p. 84.

134. John E. Peters and Jennifer Morrison Taw, "Operations Other Than War / Implications for the U.S. Army," (Santa Monica, California: RAND Arroyo Center, 1995), p. 1. Emphasis has been added.

135. Clark, "Turning Point," op cit., p. 84.

136. *Ibid.*

137. *National Security Strategy (1999)*, op cit., p. 4.

138. *Ibid.*

139. USCNS/21st Century, Phase III report, op cit., pp. 10-26. Recommendations for strategic review and structural change are made within the report. Consistent with past national security policy stated in the National Security Strategy, the Phase III report again suggests, and emphasizes, the importance of the National Guard in furthering domestic security.

140. *National Security Strategy (1999)*, op cit., p. 16.

141. Clark, "Turning Point," op cit., p. 84.

142. Clausewitz, op cit., p. 590.

143. Weigley, op cit., p. 269.

144. Clark, "Ready for What?", op cit. The emphasis given is added.

145. *Ibid.*

146. Thucydides, op cit., p. 108.

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